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RECONCEIVING THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
CRAIG M. BRADLEY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Mapp v. Ohio, decided in 1961, comprised two holdings.1 The first, and 
more controversial at the time, applied the exclusionary rule to the states, 
overruling Wolf v. Colorado,2 decided just twelve years before. But it was the 
second holding—“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation 
of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in . . . court”3—that has led to the 
“criminal procedure revolution.” And it is the second holding that is currently 
under attack by the Supreme Court. 
As a result of this second holding, the Supreme Court evidently felt 
compelled to set forth just what it was that the Constitution requires so that the 
police could follow the rules and avoid evidentiary exclusion. Thus it was that, 
in a series of cases through the 1960s and continuing to this day, the Supreme 
Court began the uniquely American practice of declaring “rules of criminal 
procedure” on a case-by-case basis,4 rather than through a comprehensive code.5 
This is contrary to the practice of all other countries of which I am aware, 
including our common-law mentors, the British, who have nationally applicable 
codes of criminal procedure.6 
It arguably follows from the American “rulemaking” practice, based as it is 
directly on the Constitution, that every search or interrogation violation is 
necessarily a violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments—and so the 
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 1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 2. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 3. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court now dismisses this holding as 
“expansive dicta.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). 
 4. See Craig Bradley, Overview, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY xxi (Craig 
Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WORLDWIDE STUDY]. 
 5. For a discussion of why this is a bad way to make rules for police to follow, see generally 
CRAIG BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993). 
 6. WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, passim. 
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Supreme Court has repeatedly assumed.7 Consequently, any evidence obtained 
in violation of the Constitution should be excluded, for it may seem logical that 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence should not be available to the government 
at trial. If, however, the rules of criminal procedure are based on a code, it does 
not seem so obvious that evidence obtained by violating some provision of it 
should not be available to the government at trial. Perhaps that is why, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “the automatic exclusionary rule applied in 
our courts is . . . ‘universally rejected’ by other countries.”8 
I have long supported the American mandatory rule. During my seven years 
as a federal prosecutor, including time as an Assistant United States Attorney 
in Washington, D.C., I could see that the rule’s mandatory nature forced police 
and federal agents to think about the rules before they acted. It caused both 
federal and local law-enforcement authorities to train their agents in the 
constitutional rules in order to afford evidentiary exclusion. In fact, my criminal 
procedure professor, Charlie Whitebread, was also the FBI’s criminal 
procedure professor. Nor was it my impression that any significant number of 
cases were lost as a result of the rule, especially prosecutions of violent felonies.9 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it is dissatisfied with 
the mandatory aspect of the Mapp rule. In two recent cases, Hudson v. 
Michigan10 and Herring v. United States,11 the Court has indicated that the rule 
should be changed but has stopped short of mandating a broad alteration. 
Although I oppose such a change, I do recognize that perfectly civilized and 
progressive countries in the world, as well as the European Court of Human 
 
 7. That is, in order for the Court to make a new “rule of criminal procedure,” it must find a 
constitutional violation in the case before it. But see infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text 
(discussing Dickerson v. United States). 
 8. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 344 (2006) (quoting Craig Bradley, Mapp Goes 
Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 399–400 (2001)). Recently, however, South Korea has adopted 
a mandatory exclusionary rule for violation of search-and-seizure rights. Honsasosongbop [Criminal 
Procedure Act] art. 308-2, as amended by Law No. 8730, Dec. 21, 2007 (S. Korea). But this is only if the 
seizure of the evidence violated the South Korean Constitution, as opposed to being in violation of the 
rules of procedure. Id. The United States has a similar nonexclusion policy with regard to searches that 
violate the regulations of the searching agency but not the Constitution. United States v. Caceres, 440 
U.S. 741, 743 (1979). 
 9. For one thirty-day period as an AUSA, I handled all motions to suppress in misdemeanor cases 
for the entire city—about 100 cases. I won every one. At the time I attributed this to my great skill, as 
not all of the cases were obviously winnable. I have since realized that it probably had more to do with 
the reluctance of trial judges to suppress evidence in all but the most egregious cases. Nor can I recall 
losing a motion to suppress when I moved up to felony trials. Statistics quoted by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) found a small percentage of cases affected by the 
rule, but the Court asserted that this “mask[ed] a large absolute number of felons who are released” 
because of the operation of the rule. Id. See generally Thomas Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know 
(and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies 
of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611. 
 10. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 11. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
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Rights, do not feel that a mandatory exclusionary rule for search and seizure 
violations is necessary.12 
In this article I discuss the Hudson and Herring decisions, the practices of 
other countries, and various previous suggestions for exclusionary-rule reform. 
Then, I set forth a reconception of the exclusionary rule, as well as the 
constitutional principles that gave rise to it. These reconceptions suggest a 
roadmap to exclusionary reform that might reconcile the factions on the Court 
(with Justice Kennedy in the middle) who strongly support and strongly oppose 
the current mandatory rule. 
I propose that the exclusionary rule apply only in cases in which it can be 
said not only that the police broke the Fourth or Fifth Amendment rules, but 
that their conduct in doing so was negligent, judged case-by-case—in other 
words, when the search was “unreasonable,” which is all that the Fourth 
Amendment forbids. Such a change becomes possible if we think of the “rules” 
produced by the Supreme Court as being not manifestations of the 
Constitution, but rather rules in aid of constitutional rights. This approach will 
produce different results from the current law in three situations: (1) when 
police rely on Supreme Court precedent that the Court changes, when faced 
with the police’s actions, (2) when the law is unclear and the police make a 
reasonable guess as to what the appropriate standard should be, and (3) when 
the police wrongly, but reasonably, believe that the facts in their possession 
justified their acts. Currently all such cases lead to exclusion. Under this 
proposal, none of them would. 
II 
HUDSON AND HERRING: WHAT THE COURT SAYS NOW 
A. Michigan v. Hudson 
In Hudson, the police came to the defendant’s residence with a search 
warrant for drugs and firearms. They knocked and announced and then, 
without waiting for an appropriate period so that the suspects could answer the 
door, they burst into the house. The law at the time required that, to comply 
with the Fourth Amendment, the officers should have waited fifteen to twenty 
seconds before entering13 or should have been able to show a reasonable belief 
that knocking and announcing would be dangerous or futile.14 
 
 12. Apparently because of concern about false confessions, other countries tend to apply the 
exclusionary rule more often to confessions that do not conform to the rules. See Craig Bradley, 
Interrogation and Silence: A Comparative Study, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 271 (2009); infra part III. 
 13. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 40–41 (2003). 
 14. 547 U.S. at 589–90 (citations omitted). 
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In an opinion joined by four Justices,15 Justice Scalia conceded that the 
police had violated the Fourth Amendment but held that, nevertheless, the 
evidence should not have been excluded at the trial. Terming the above holding 
of Mapp “expansive dicta,” the Court claimed that “suppression of evidence . . . 
has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”16 Moreover, the Court 
declared that “but-for causality is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition 
for suppression.”17 In other words, even if the police would not have obtained 
the evidence but for the Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence did not 
necessarily have to be suppressed. 
The Court went on to discuss why “knock and announce” violations in 
particular were not appropriate for evidentiary exclusion. First was the lack of a 
“but-for” connection between the violation and the finding of the evidence. 
That is, the police would have found the evidence here even if they had waited 
the appropriate period after knocking and announcing;18 therefore, the finding 
of the evidence was “attenuated” from the violation.19 The exclusionary rule is 
also inapplicable when the interest served by the knock-and-announce rule, the 
opportunity of the resident to “comply with the law and to avoid the destruction 
of property occasioned by a forcible entry,” had “nothing to do with the seizure 
of the evidence.”20 
Second, “the exclusionary rule has never been applied except ‘where its 
deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.’”21 Here, the cost—the 
exclusion of evidence—was not appropriate for what the Court obviously 
considered a trivial benefit. Moreover, application of the rule would over-deter 
the police. That is, “if the consequences of running afoul of the rule were so 
massive, officers would be inclined to wait longer than the law requires—
producing preventable violence against officers in some cases, and the 
destruction of evidence in many others.”22 The Court claimed that civil remedies 
would be adequate to redress knock-and-announce violations.23 
Finally, in the portion of the opinion not joined by Justice Kennedy, the 
plurality claimed that three previous cases, Segura v. United States,24 New York 
 
 15. Justice Scalia authored the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and 
Thomas. Justice Kennedy concurred in most of the opinion and in the result. Id. at 587. 
 16. Id. at 591. In an appendix to his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer cited forty-one cases decided 
between 1914 and 2003 in which evidence had been suppressed due to a Fourth Amendment violation. 
Accord Sharon Davies & Anna Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v. Michigan: Some Thoughts on 
“Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2008) (declaring that the majority’s 
assertion “defies historical truth”). 
 17. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592. 
 18. Id. at 593–94. 
 19. E.g., id. at 592–93. 
 20. Id. at 594. 
 21. Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)). 
 22. Id. at 595. 
 23. Id. at 597–98. 
 24. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
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v. Harris,25 and United States v. Ramirez,26 supported the conclusion “that 
suppression is unwarranted in this case.”27 In Segura, the police illegally entered 
an apartment without a warrant and waited there for nineteen hours until the 
warrant arrived. Although the Supreme Court agreed that evidence found 
during the nineteen-hour period had to be suppressed, it allowed evidence 
seized after a search pursuant to the warrant to be used at trial under an 
“independent source” rationale.28 That is, the police acting on the legally 
obtained warrant were “independent” of those who had entered illegally. 
Because the police behavior in Segura was worse than that in Hudson, the 
Hudson Court concluded that it would be “bizarre” to suppress the evidence in 
that case.29 
In Harris, the police made an illegal entry without a warrant to arrest the 
defendant. Although the Court held that any statements made or evidence 
seized inside the house must be excluded, it allowed defendant Harris’s 
subsequent statement at the station house to be admitted at his trial. The 
plurality declared that 
“[Harris’ statement] was not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house 
rather than someplace else.” Likewise here: While acquisition of the gun and drugs 
was the product of a search pursuant to warrant, it was not the fruit of the fact that the 
entry was not preceded by knock-and-announce.30 
In other words, the “no but-for causation” argument, repeated.31 
In Ramirez, the Court stated in dictum that destruction of property during 
an otherwise legal search might violate the Fourth Amendment but would not 
lead necessarily to evidentiary exclusion: “What clearer expression could there 
be of the proposition that an impermissible manner of entry does not 
necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule?”32 But as a practical matter, property 
destruction, if significant and unnecessary, could be the subject of a civil suit, 
with substantial attorney’s fees—unlike the violation in Hudson. 
The bottom line for at least four Justices in Hudson is not just that the 
mandatory exclusionary rule has got to go, but that it is already gone. This was 
certainly news to the dissent, as well as to those of us who have taught Fourth 
Amendment law for many years. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, the crucial fifth vote, 
“underscored” two points about the decision.33 First, that “the court’s decision 
should not be interpreted as suggesting that violations of the requirement [to 
 
 25. 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
 26. 523 U.S. 65 (1998). 
 27. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599–600. 
 28. Id. at 600. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 601. 
 31. See id. Contrary to the result in Hudson, in both Segurra and Harris, the police did suffer the 
loss of some evidence as penalty for their illegal behavior. 
 32. Id. at 602. 
 33. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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knock and announce] are trivial or beyond the law’s concern.”34 But, of course, 
the opinion will have just the opposite effect. Because the police will now know 
that “knock and announce” violations will not be enforced by evidentiary 
exclusion and that civil suits will be useless to complain about the loss of twenty 
seconds of privacy, they will feel free to ignore the knock-and-announce 
requirement. Second, Kennedy adumbrated, “the continued operation of the 
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt. 
Today’s decision determines only that in the specific context of the knock-and-
announce requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the later 
discovery of evidence to justify suppression.”35 
This seemed an extraordinary statement, given all that Kennedy had agreed 
to in the majority opinion. The bottom line of Hudson, given Kennedy’s 
reservations, is that four Justices made it clear they wanted to broadly 
reconsider the mandatory exclusionary rule, but a fifth was only agreeing that in 
the case of knock-and-announce violations, the rule would not be applied. Still, 
Kennedy’s joining the opinion suggests that he also believed some sort of 
reconsideration of the rule was desirable. 
B. Herring v. United States 
The Court returned to the exclusionary rule two terms later in Herring v. 
United States,36 in which it tried to establish a more-detailed approach as to 
when evidence would and would not be excluded. In Herring, the police in 
Coffee County, Alabama, arrested Herring based on information from a 
warrant clerk of neighboring Dale County, who had informed them that 
Herring was wanted for failure to appear on a felony charge. After his arrest, 
Herring was searched and a gun and drugs were found, which formed the basis 
of the federal charges against him. It turned out that the Dale County computer 
records were incorrect and that a warrant against Herring had been withdrawn 
five months before. 
The evidence was nevertheless admitted against him and he was convicted. 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the arresting officers were “entirely 
innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness” and that the error by the Dale 
County authorities was “negligent.”37 The Supreme Court affirmed Herring’s 
conviction by a five-to-four vote in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, with 
Justice Kennedy offering no reservations. The Court’s narrow holding is best 
summarized in the syllabus to the case: “When police mistakes leading to an 
unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, 
rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, 
the exclusionary rule does not apply.”38 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 603. 
 36. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 37. United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’d 129 S. Ct. 695. 
 38. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 697. All of this is in the opinion, it is just not stated as succinctly. 
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Contrary to Hudson, which seemed to suggest simply that one particular 
class of police behavior, no-knock entries with valid search warrants, would not 
be subject to the exclusionary remedy,39 Herring holds that in each case there 
should be a separate inquiry into the culpability of the police. If the police error 
was due to “isolated negligence attenuated from the search,” the evidence will 
not be suppressed. If, on the other hand, there was “systemic error or reckless 
disregard of constitutional requirements,” the evidence will be excluded.40 
The difficulty is that this holding will not apply to most cases, despite the 
majority’s apparent attempt in dictum to dramatically limit the operation of the 
exclusionary rule. If the police conclude, for example, that exigent 
circumstances justify a warrantless entry of a home but the trial judge disagrees 
with them, should the evidence be suppressed or not? Since such a decision led 
directly to the search, it is not “attenuated,” even if negligent. Therefore, under 
the holding of Herring, the evidence should be suppressed, even though much 
of the opinion—suggesting that negligent errors by police are excusable—would 
indicate the contrary. Likewise, suppose the police decide that they have 
probable cause to search a car. The trial judge concludes that they lacked 
probable cause. Again, even if the trial judge concluded that their decision was 
not reckless, the evidence must be excluded because the Fourth Amendment 
violation is in no sense “attenuated” from the search. 
The word “attenuated” dramatically narrows the holding in Herring. The 
term is likely present as the price of Justice Kennedy’s joining the opinion.41 If 
one reads the summarized holding without the phrase “attenuated from the 
search,” the remaining language in Herring comes much closer to what the rest 
of the opinion seems to be aiming at: not excluding evidence when the police 
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights either through simple 
mistake or negligence, and excluding evidence only when the police behavior 
was reckless or systematic. 
It is not the purpose of this article to again critique the Hudson and Herring 
decisions in detail.42 Rather, the purpose here is to take seriously the view of 
five Justices that the exclusionary rule must be reconsidered and to come up 
with an approach that limits the rule without undermining all of the positive 
effects it has had on police training and behavior, albeit at the cost of some loss 
of evidence in criminal cases. 
Viewing Hudson and Herring on their facts, without thinking about the 
implications for the future of Fourth Amendment law, a neutral observer would 
 
 39. Specifically no-knock entries with search warrants, Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, along with the 
Court’s prior precedent—for example, search-warrant cases, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), 
and cases in which the police relied on an error by a court clerk, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 40. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704. 
 41. Craig Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary Rule?, TRIAL, Apr. 2009, at 52, 53. 
 42. Id.; Craig Bradley, Mixed Messages on the Exclusionary Rule, TRIAL, Dec. 2006, at 56, 56. 
Professor LaFave has dissected Herring from head to tail and declared it noisome. See generally Wayne 
R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary 
Rule, 99 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009). 
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probably agree with the outcome of both cases. After all, the violation in 
Hudson was unrelated to the finding of the evidence and was a very minor 
breach of the defendant’s privacy. In Herring, the mistake was made, apparently 
in good faith, by a clerk in another police department—the arresting police 
were in no way at fault. Certainly a European or Canadian lawyer or judge 
would conclude that the evidence should not be suppressed in either case. 
III 
THE EXCLUSIONARY LAW IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
A. Canada 
Canada’s 1982 Charter 9 (its constitutional document) actually contains an 
exclusionary rule. It provides that if evidence is obtained in a manner that 
infringes or denies any rights under the charter, the evidence must be excluded 
from a criminal trial if, “having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of 
it . . . would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”43  
Canada has a two-part approach to exclusion, the first being based on the 
fairness of the trial.44 This is essentially mandatory, subject to an inevitable-
discovery exception, and involves illegal “conscription” of the accused. 
“Conscription” means obtaining the defendant’s cooperation in violation of 
Canada’s version of the Miranda requirements, which includes informing the 
defendant not only that he has a right to counsel but that there is a duty that 
counsel be available to assist him. This exclusionary rule also applies to fruits of 
the poisonous tree of these violations.45 
The second part of the approach is to exclude any evidence whose admission 
might be seen as judicially condoning a “serious” violation of Canada’s Charter. 
Whether a violation is “serious” “depends on whether the police violated the 
Charter deliberately or inadvertently.” The seriousness of the violation is not 
mitigated by the conclusion that the police could have obtained the evidence 
otherwise, legally; and it can be aggravated if it is apparent “that the police 
could have done their job without violating the [rights of the] accused.”46 
Violations committed in good faith are not considered serious, and good faith 
has been defined broadly “to include reliance upon legislation, warrants, policy 
directives, prior cases, legal advice or accepted practices . . . later found to be 
unconstitutional.” Good faith does not include an officer’s “subjective belief 
 
 43. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 24(2) (U.K.). 
 44. Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, at 71. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally EDWARD L. GREENSPAN & MARC ROSENBERG, 
MARTIN’S ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE 2009 1791–95 (2008) for a summary of exclusionary law under 
the Charter. 
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that a search was authorized” if that belief is “based on unreasonable error” or 
the officer’s ignorance of the limits of his authority.47 
Thus, as to purely search-and-seizure violations, Canada uses a 
nonmandatory rule somewhat similar to what the Supreme Court seemed to be 
getting at in Herring: excluding evidence when police are “unreasonable” in 
reaching a good-faith conclusion that their actions are proper. Among the 
evidence that it has excluded under the second approach has been 
drugs . . . seized by a choke hold when the police did not have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the accused was a drug handler; . . . drugs . . . seized through a defective 
warrant and a no knock entry with excessive force; . . . drugs . . .seized through an 
intrusive and unconstitutional rectal search; . . . drugs . . . seized after a trespass 
without reasonable grounds that the police ought to have known was illegal; . . . 
bloody clothes and other evidence in a murder case . . . seized after the police made a 
warrantless entry and arrest in the accused home without even a subjective belief that 
they had grounds for an arrest and engaged in a pattern of Charter violations; and 
[evidence found] when the police searched the pocket of a person subject to 
investigative detention for reasons not related to traffic safety.48 
In the 1997 case of R. v. Feeney, the court excluded evidence obtained when 
the police violated the Charter by making a warrantless entry and search of the 
accused’s trailer. The police based their suspicion on the presence of the 
accused near the scene of a murder, rather than on reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest the accused for murder.49 By suppressing the evidence, the 
Supreme Court of Canada changed the rule that warrantless arrests in the home 
were allowed on “reasonable and probable grounds” and required a warrant. 
The evidence would not have been suppressed if the police had relied in good 
faith on the law applicable at the time of the entry and search. Suppression was 
required “because the police admitted that they did not even subjectively 
believe they had grounds for an arrest when they entered the trailer.”50 
Before excluding evidence under the second test, the courts must consider 
the seriousness of the offense charged, the importance of the evidence sought to 
be excluded, and “the reactions of reasonable people under all the 
circumstances.”51 If the evidence is crucial to the prosecution’s case, the court 
will sometimes not exclude it, even though similar misconduct might lead to 
excluding less-critical evidence in another case.52 The accused has the burden of 
establishing that use of the evidence would bring the “administration of justice 
into disrepute.”53 
 
 47. Roach, supra note 44, at 71. 
 48. Id. at 72 (footnotes omitted). 
 49. [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 (Can.). 
 50. Roach, supra note 4, at 64. 
 51. Id. at 72.  
 52. Id. at 72. 
 53. Id. at 73. But see Hunter v. Southam. Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.), a civil case in which the 
court held that if a building is searched without a warrant when one was feasible, the burden shifts to 
the government to establish that the search was not unreasonable. 
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Thus, though Canada has strict rules regarding interrogations and a tough 
exclusionary policy for violating those rules, its search-and-seizure rules, while 
similar to ours, are not backed by tough mandatory exclusion. Because 
questionable evidence has ultimately been excluded in a number of cases, 
however, the nonmandatory rule is apparently being invoked often enough to 
deter some negligent or “unreasonable” behavior by the police. 
Two recent Canadian Supreme Court cases cast some further light on 
Canada’s approach to the exclusionary rule. In R. v. Harrison,54 an Ontario 
policeman activated his roof lights to stop a van for having no front license 
plates. He then realized that the van was from Alberta, which did not require 
front plates. He stopped the van anyway and found that the driver was driving 
with a suspended license. A search incident to the driver’s arrest then revealed 
thirty-five kilograms of cocaine. The policeman testified that he had stopped 
the van despite its lawful plates because “abandoning the detention would have 
affected the integrity of the police in the eyes of observers.”55 The trial court 
disbelieved his testimony and concluded that the police (for unstated reasons) 
had suspected the van’s driver all along. 
The trial judge concluded that the police had seriously violated the Charter 
but admitted the cocaine nevertheless. The Supreme Court disagreed on the 
ground that the Charter breach by the police was “reckless and showed an 
insufficient regard for Charter rights.”56 It ordered the defendant’s conviction 
reversed. Although this evidence would also have been suppressed in America,57 
it is doubtful that many American courts would have found this violation 
“reckless,” given the relatively minor Fourth Amendment breach and (though it 
is supposed to be irrelevant) the large amount of cocaine found. 
In R. v. Grant,58 the police, with no reasonable suspicion, cornered the 
defendant on the sidewalk such that he would not feel free to leave. They then 
asked him if he had a gun; he admitted that he did. They seized it and convicted 
him of firearms violations. Although the Canadian Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction for technical reasons, it concluded that the admission of the gun was 
proper, despite the Charter violation that led to its discovery. The court found 
that the “police conduct was neither deliberate nor egregious and there was no 
suggestion that the accused was the target of racial profiling or other 
discriminatory police practices.”59 
The court applied a new three-part test to determine if exclusion was 
appropriate: “(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct . . . (2) 
the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused . . . 
 
 54. [2009] 309 D.L.R. 87 (Can.). 
 55. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 56. Id. at ¶ 24. 
 57. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (requiring reasonable suspicion to stop a car). 
 58. [2009] 309 D.L.R. 1 (Can.). 
 59. Id. at intro. 
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and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.”60 The 
court stressed that these factors do not refer to any adverse reaction to the 
exclusion of evidence in any particular case, but rather to whether “the overall 
repute of the justice system, viewed in the long term, will be adversely affected 
by admission of the evidence.”61 Finally, the court noted that “good faith” on 
the part of the police would also reduce the need for exclusion, but “ignorance 
of Charter standards must not be rewarded or encouraged and negligence or 
willful blindness cannot be equated with good faith.”62 
Taking these factors into account, and noting that “the gun is highly reliable 
evidence,”63 the court upheld the trial court’s refusal to exclude the evidence. 
The different results in these two cases seem inconsistent. Both cases involved a 
stop without reasonable suspicion and, without further breach of the rules by 
police, the seizure of real evidence. Moreover, a showing that police were 
negligent as to Charter standards would appear be a significant factor leading to 
exclusion. Nevertheless, these cases do show that the Canadian courts are 
wrestling with the issue of exclusion. 
B. England and Wales 
England, like Canada, has tough interrogation rules and applies tough 
exclusionary principles to their violation.64 When it comes to search and seizure, 
however, “that evidence has been obtained by unlawful or improper means 
does not necessarily (or, except in relation to confessions, even usually)” 
require its exclusion at trial.65 Trial judges have discretion to exclude evidence 
obtained in the course of a search “if in all circumstances admitting it would 
make the proceedings unfair.”66 Although there are examples of such exclusion 
at the trial and appellate levels,67 Britain’s highest court, the House of Lords—
unlike the Canada Supreme Court—has not developed a body of search-and-
seizure cases in which the exclusionary remedy has been applied, and no 
guidelines for exclusion exist. 
Perhaps more likely to further the development of the exclusionary rule in 
England (and in the rest of Europe) is the decision of the European Court of 
 
 60. Id. at ¶ 71. 
 61. Id. at ¶ 68. 
 62. Id. at ¶ 75 (emphasis added). 
 63. Id. at ¶ 139. 
 64. “Failure to caution a suspect and wrongful refusal of access to legal advice are serious and 
substantial breaches” that lead to exclusion. David Feldman, England, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra 
note 4, at 172. However, England also has “The English Warning” that a defendant’s failure to respond 
to questions may be used against him if inconsistent with his defense at trial. Interrogation and Silence, 
supra note 12, at 285. 
 65. Feldman, supra note 64, at 163. 
 66. Id. (referring to The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984, c. 60, § 78 (Eng.)). 
 67. See, e.g., DPP v. Godwin, (1991) R.T.R. 303 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (excluding evidence from 
breathalyzer test when police lacked reasonable cause to stop motorist); R v. Fennelley [1989] Crim. 
L.R. 142 (excluding evidence when an officer failed to comply with the requirement that he tell the 
suspect why he was being arrested and searched). 
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Human Rights in Khan v. United Kingdom.68 In that case, Khan visited a friend, 
B, who was already under investigation for dealing in heroin. The South 
Yorkshire police had planted an electronic bug in B’s house, which violated the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Khan was recorded telling B that he 
was a coconspirator in drug smuggling. Khan moved to suppress the recording 
on the ground that the bug was illegally planted. The Crown admitted that there 
was no domestic statutory system to regulate police use of electronic listening 
devices. Khan was convicted solely on the basis of the tape, and the Court of 
Appeals and the House of Lords each upheld his conviction. The House of 
Lords agreed with the defendant that the surveillance had violated Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits police from 
intruding into certain private matters.69 Nevertheless, noting that the recording 
did not violate British law, the Lords upheld the trial judge’s finding that its use 
did not render the trial unfair.70 
The European Court of Human Rights agreed with Khan that the South 
Yorkshire police had violated Article 8.71 That the questioned evidence was 
essentially the government’s whole case was not determinative, the court noted, 
since “there was no risk [of the evidence] being unreliable.”72 Likewise, the 
court concluded by a vote of six to one that the trial was “fair” under the 
Convention and that the evidence need not have been excluded. The court 
summarized its position, stating, 
[I]t is not the role of the court to determine as, a matter of principle, whether 
particular types of evidence—for example unlawfully obtained evidence—may be 
admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question . . . is 
whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was 
obtained, were fair.73 
Thus the court rejected the use of a mandatory exclusionary rule in cases 
concerning a violation of the Convention. 
C. France 
French rules regarding search and seizure seem disturbingly vague by 
American standards. For example, there is no search-warrant requirement for 
dwellings. In serious-offense cases, the police may “enter and search the 
domicile of all ‘persons who appear to have participated’ in the offense or ‘to be 
in possession of papers or objects relating to’ the crime, and seize any evidence 
 
 68. 31 Eur. Ct. H.R 45, (2001). 
 69. R. v. Khan, [1997] A.C. 558 (H.L.). Article 8 provides in § 1 that “[e]veryone has the right to 
respect for his private life and his correspondence” and in § 2 that “[t]here shall be no interference by 
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with law and is necessary in 
a democratic society. . . . For the prevention of disorder or crime. . . .” Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. 
 70. [1997] A.C. 558 (H.L.). 
 71. Kahn, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 45, para. 28. 
 72. Id. at para. 37. 
 73. Id. at para. 33. 
BRADLEY 12/22/2010  3:28:35 PM 
Summer 2010]  RECONCEIVING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 223 
‘useful to the manifestation of the truth.’”74 No particular level of suspicion is 
required, though there are limitations as to time of entry, the presence of a 
witness, and special provisions designed to protect confidential information.75 
To the extent that domicile searches are regulated, however, French law applies 
a mandatory exclusionary rule to all wrongly obtained evidence, as well as to 
violations regulating identity checks and wiretaps.76 But only those violations 
“deemed to have violated ‘substantial’ provisions of the code or other laws 
related to criminal procedure” lead to the exclusion of evidence. Which 
procedural rules are so “substantial” as to merit recognition is within the court’s 
discretion. Courts must find, further, “that the violation has caused ‘harm to the 
interests of the party that it concerns.’”77 Both mandatory and discretionary 
exclusion may also result in exclusion of the fruits of the poisonous tree and are 
not limited by principles of standing.78 
D. Germany 
Germany—like Canada, England, and France—is tough on interrogation 
violations; but, compared to America, Germany is lax on evidentiary exclusion 
for search-and-seizure violations. Germany insists that it has no mandatory rule 
except as to confessions obtained by violence, threats, hypnosis, or, surprisingly 
to Americans, deception.79 Otherwise, in each case the interests of the state in 
prosecution must be balanced against the suspect’s rights. Still, the Federal 
Court of Appeals has explicitly recognized that “a functioning system of 
criminal justice must exist in a state based on the rule of law (Rechtstaat).”80 
Consequently, German courts have held that certain violations “normally” 
will result in exclusion, including confessions obtained without the proper 
Miranda-type warnings and those confessions for which access to counsel prior 
to interrogation was denied.81 By contrast, “the fruits of illegal searches are 
usually held admissible.”82 But German courts do consider the extent to which 
the evidence impinges on the defendant’s private sphere; thus evidence from 
diaries, from the files of a drug treatment clinic, and from the bugging of a 
private home have been held inadmissible, sometimes regardless of the legality 
of seizure, depending on the seriousness of the case.83 
 
 74. Richard S. Frase, France, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, at 211 (quoting CODE DE 
PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 54 (Fr.)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 212. 
 77. Id. at 212–13 (quoting C. PR. PÉN. art. 171). 
 78. Id. at 213. 
 79. Thomas Weigand, Germany, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4, at 251. Such statements are 
presumed involuntary. Id. at 258. 
 80. Id. at 251. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 252. 
 83. Id. and cases cited therein. See Craig Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1032 (1983) (discussing German exclusionary principles in detail). 
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Germany’s exclusionary rule is nonmandatory; nevertheless, the Federal 
Court of Appeals recently ordered the suppression of evidence found in the 
defendant’s apartment due to the failure of police to obtain a search warrant.84 
The police arrested the suspect at four o’clock in the afternoon, and then waited 
until eight o’clock that night to search his home, arguing that by then it was too 
late to get a warrant. The court held that evidence will be excluded if the police 
or the prosecutor intentionally or “arbitrarily” (that is, based on a clear 
violation of standard procedures) disregards the warrant requirement. The 
court rejected the government’s “inevitable discovery” argument on the ground 
that it would encourage the police to ignore the warrant requirement.85 
So why do these other countries seem to care less about search violations 
than interrogation violations—leaving aside involuntary confessions, which are 
always punished by mandatory exclusion? And why do they care less about 
search violations than Americans? Certainly the interference with one’s privacy 
occasioned by an illegal search of one’s home or, especially, by an unjustified 
arrest is far worse than the failure to receive proper Miranda warnings. 
Professor Kent Roach observes that the Canadian nonmandatory rule was 
written specifically with (rejection of) the American mandatory rule in mind, 
but does not opine on the reason for the difference.86 Professor David Feldman 
points to England’s common-law tradition of nonexclusion on the ground that 
exclusion of relevant evidence makes the trial less reliable, but notes that this 
has recently given ground to the nonmandatory rule because of “concerns about 
police malpractice.”87 But like Roach, Feldman can point to no differences 
between England and America to explain the different rules. 
Professor Richard Frase points to several factors about France that might be 
relevant: 
Continued strong belief in the inquisitorial search for the truth . . . . The French don’t 
have as explicit a constitutional guarantee in this area; even the European Convention 
text is more vague on this than the Fourth Amendment . . . . Continuing deference to 
the police—especially officers of the traditional police—who conduct most of these 
operations.88 
I doubt whether the attitude of Americans as a whole toward evidentiary 
exclusion differs much from those of the citizens of these other countries. Most 
would probably agree that evidence should be suppressed only when police 
behavior flagrantly violates the rules. I suspect that the Supreme Court’s 
adoption of the rule in Mapp was a stringent effort to protect racial minorities 
from police overreaching, rather than a reflection of American attitudes toward 
 
 84. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 18, 2007, 51 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 285 (F.R.G.). 
 85. Id. 
 86. E-mail from Kent Roach, Prichard-Wilson Chair, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto to 
author (Apr. 20, 2009) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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police behavior.89 As other countries have grown more ethnically diverse, 
evidentiary exclusion has become more common, but only in Canada does it 
seem common enough to have any effect on deterring police misconduct, 
though Germany may be headed in that direction. It remains an interesting 
question why other countries seem to be at least as concerned about 
interrogation violations as we are, but less concerned, at least legally, about 
search–and-seizure violations. 
The structure of American criminal procedure seems to have played a part 
in the development of the mandatory exclusionary rule.90 As adumbrated by the 
Supreme Court in Weeks, and reiterated in Mapp, 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence 
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, 
and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution.91 
It does not seem particularly obvious that every violation should lead to 
exclusion. If the police have simply violated a code of procedure implicating no 
constitutional rights, exclusion of evidence might not be called for. If, on the 
other hand, that violation does infringe on constitutional rights, then exclusion 
of evidence seems to follow more logically. 
IV 
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS  
The exclusionary rule has been rethought many times. Wigmore offered the 
first major criticism of the rule shortly after it was declared by the Court in 
Weeks: 
[The exclusionary rule] puts . . . [c]ourts in the position of assisting to undermine the 
foundations of the very institutions they are set there to protect. It regards the 
overzealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the community than the 
unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer. . . . [T]he forces of criminality, fraud, 
anarchy, and law evasion perceived the advantage [of the rule] and made vigorous use 
of it. . . . [T]he judicial excesses of many [c]ourts in sanctioning its use give an 
impression of maudlin compliance which would be ludicrous were it not so dangerous 
to the general respect for law and order in the community.92 
Accordingly, Wigmore proposed both civil suits and criminal prosecution of 
police as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.93 
Forty years later, John Kaplan proposed limiting the exclusionary rule to 
“non-serious” crimes.94 Thus, for murder, treason and espionage, armed 
 
 89. Though this does not explain the original application of the rule to federal authorities in Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See Michael Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal 
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000). 
 90. E-mail, supra note 86; see supra part II. 
 91. 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1913); 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961). 
 92. John H. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by an Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 
480–82 (1922). The identical language appears in 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 2184 (2d ed. 1923). 
 93. Wigmore, Using Evidence, supra note 92, at 484. 
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robbery, and kidnapping by organized groups, exclusion would occur only if the 
police engaged in “conscience shocking” behavior.95 Kaplan would not have 
applied the rule “to cases where the police department in question has taken 
seriously its responsibility to adhere to the fourth amendment,” as reflected by 
a set of published regulations giving guidance to police officers as to proper behavior 
in situations such as the one under litigation, a training program calculated to make 
violations of the fourth amendment rights isolated occurrences, and, perhaps most 
importantly, a history of taking disciplinary action where such violations are brought 
to its attention.96 
In other words, if the police usually made a good-faith effort to follow the 
Fourth Amendment, even if the officers blatantly ignored Fourth Amendment 
restrictions, the evidence should not be excluded unless police behavior 
“shocked the conscience,” as it might if they physically abused the subjects of 
the search.97 
If, under Kaplan’s scheme, the burden were on the government to prove the 
police’s good-faith effort to comply with the Constitution, and if this burden 
were met, it would suggest that, overall, compliance was high and exclusion 
unnecessary since deterrence was being achieved in general, if not in any one 
case. An overall practice of police compliance would be equally desirable, 
however, and apparently exists to some extent under the current mandatory 
rule. Yet a mandatory rule does not seem to have stopped illegal searches. A 
scheme based on the notion that “we’ll let you get away with it this time” does 
not seem as effective. Nor does the same scheme with the burden placed on the 
defendant to disprove good faith, for it would be very difficult for him to show a 
pattern of violations to demonstrating that the police preventive measures were 
not working. 
In reply to Kaplan’s argument that the exclusionary rule should not be 
applied in cases of “serious” crimes,98 Yale Kamisar has pointed out that this 
would give a prosecutor the power to avoid the exclusionary remedy simply by 
charging the defendant with such a serious crime. For example, a prosecutor 
might charge a defendant with murder even though, without the illegally seized 
evidence (or even with it), the most that he could prove was manslaughter.99 
More generally, why should police be excused from penalty for violations in 
those serious cases in which they are most likely to want to commit them? And, 
as Kamisar notes, the temptation to expand the category of “serious” crimes 
will likely be overwhelming.100 
 
 94. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974). 
 95. Id. at 1046. 
 96. Id. at 1050–51 (footnotes omitted). 
 97. Id. at 1046. Rochin v. California first established the “shocked the conscience” test in the due 
process context. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
 98. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1047. 
 99. See Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary 
Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1987). 
 100. Id. at 17–18. 
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The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure suggests a different 
approach, not unlike approaches used by other countries, focusing on many 
circumstances.101 The Code would have the trial judge consider the importance 
of the evidence, the magnitude and willfulness of the police violation, “the 
extent to which exclusion [would] tend to prevent violations of this Code,” 
whether there was a “but for” relationship between the evidence and the 
violation, and “the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party’s 
ability to support his motion or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the 
things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.”102 
Kaplan rejected this approach as “unadministerable.”103 Because some of the 
factors do not seem to make much sense, he is likely correct. But if we view the 
test as just telling the trial judge to consider all relevant factors, as other 
countries do, it is not so much “unadministerable” as conferring huge discretion 
on the trial judge. Judges who are so inclined will virtually always be able to line 
up the various factors in favor of nonexclusion, as seems to be done in 
England.104 The whole point of the exclusionary rule must be that it compels 
judges in certain cases, including some cases that do not involve outrageous 
police conduct, to go against their tendency to make all evidence available to 
the jury, and to exclude evidence in order to encourage the police to follow the 
rules in the future. 
For example, in the next few months there will undoubtedly be police who 
will follow the old auto-search rule of New York v. Belton,105 rather than the new 
rule of Arizona v. Gant.106 That is, they will search the passenger compartment 
of a car upon the arrest of the driver without any reason to believe that 
evidence might be found. In some cases, police will find incriminating evidence. 
Assume that police unaware of the new rule in Gant find evidence of a felony. 
A court applying a balancing test, like that in the Model Pre-Arraignment 
Code, would note that the police were unaware of the new rule, that the 
intrusion on the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights was relatively minor, 
and that such a minor intrusion had in fact been legal until recently. The court 
would probably admit the evidence. Such a practice would encourage police 
departments not to bother to make sure that their officers are aware of recent 
Supreme Court decisions, but to simply slouch along, conducting business as 
usual. 
 
 101. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §150.3 (statements), § 290.2 (seized 
evidence) (1975). 
 102. Id. §150.3; see also William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives 
to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1385 (1981) (discussing various proposals to alter or 
eliminate the exclusionary rule). 
 103. Kaplan, supra note 94, at 1048 n.106. 
 104. Few if any judges will be inclined to virtually always favor exclusion, but might be more 
inclined to do so in close cases. 
 105. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 106. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
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Another prominent critic of the exclusionary rule is Judge Richard Posner. 
His solution is civil suits, though he concedes that juries will be 
“unsympathetic” to the claims of guilty defendants.107 Like the Supreme Court 
in Hudson, he seems to think that class-action lawsuits against police 
departments that have systematic policies of performing illegal searches in 
particular neighborhoods would be sufficient to deter police misconduct. 
Although civil suits might suffice to deter that kind of police misconduct, they 
would do nothing for the average suspected drug possessor who had been 
subjected to an illegal frisk, car search, or arrest. 
Of course, as Posner argues, we do not care about the defendant in a 
particular case. Why should “the criminal . . . go free because the constable . . . 
blundered,” as Judge Cardozo put it.108 The reason for exclusion is to deter the 
police from doing this all the time. If we offer the defendant only the specious 
opportunity to bring a civil suit,109 there will be nothing to discourage the police 
from illegally searching the next defendant, and the next thousand as well, as 
long as they do so on an individual basis (as they generally do) rather than as 
part of a preconceived departmental plan. Civil suits are a worthwhile adjunct 
to exclusion: exclusion does not help victims of police illegality who are in fact, 
innocent, but civil suits do when substantial injury has occurred. Suits do not 
help guilty victims of police misconduct, as Posner concedes,110 but exclusion 
does. The two combine to deter police misconduct if applied on a regular 
enough basis that police will consider the realistic threat of penalty before 
acting. 
The bottom line of all of the alternative remedies suggested over the years is 
that their use is not so likely that they would have a significant deterrent effect 
on police. If a jurisdiction were to establish a police-review board that would 
consistently punish wayward officers and compensate victims of police abuse of 
constitutional rights, regardless of the victim’s guilt, then we should seriously 
 
 107. Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 59. Akhil Amar 
likewise promotes various civil remedies as the only proper approach. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 40–43 (1997). But see Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 
695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Civil liability will not lie for the ‘vast majority of Fourth 
Amendment violations—the frequent infringements motivated by commendable zeal, not condemnable 
malice.’”) (quoting Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1389 
(1983)). 
 108. People v. DeFore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926). 
 109. Civil suits are a specious remedy not only because guilty defendants are unlikely to win, but 
because most Fourth Amendment violations do not cause substantial, financially quantifiable damage 
to their victims. What are the damages for a warrantless search of one’s home when the police have 
probable cause and could have gotten a warrant? Because attorney’s fees are limited to 1.5 times the 
actual damages incurred, civil suits are an ineffective deterrent. See Term in Review, 75 U.S.L.W. 3089, 
3090 (2006) (summarizing Yale Kamisar’s remarks referring to the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 
limits on attorneys’ fees). 
 110. Posner, supra note 107, at 59–60. 
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consider doing away with the exclusionary rule.111 There is no reason not to put 
such a body into place now. But the proponents of various alternative remedies 
want to abolish the rule now and hope that something will spring up that will 
magically take its place. 
V 
THE SUPREME COURT’S PROPOSAL 
Now the Supreme Court has joined the ranks of those who believe that the 
mandatory exclusionary rule must be reconsidered. The apparent view of four 
of the members of the Herring majority is that evidence should be suppressed 
only when the violation of the Fourth Amendment by police is reckless or 
systemic.112 As the majority opinion put it, “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to 
deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,”113 as if this were already the 
rule. In short, the exclusion decision should be based entirely on the culpability 
of the police without regard for any other factors, such as the nature or 
importance of the evidence in question, the seriousness of the case, or any other 
factors considered in the balance by other countries when making the 
exclusionary decision. If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police 
misconduct, as the Court declares that it is,114 then these other factors are 
irrelevant. The Court is correct to focus on this issue. Allowing courts to 
consider all factors makes it too easy to find a way to admit questionably 
obtained evidence. 
What these various terms of culpability mean is pertinent to the feasibility of 
any proof of misconduct. “Reckless” conduct is “[c]haracterized by the creation 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious (and 
sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk.”115 Negligence is 
“[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the 
legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of 
harm . . . .”116 Police are “reckless” if they consciously disregard a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that their conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. They 
are negligent if they fail to exercise a degree of concern toward Fourth 
Amendment rights that a reasonable and prudent police officer would have 
exercised. 
 
 111. See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 363 (proposing a new system of damages specifically aimed at dealing with constitutional 
violations by police). 
 112. See supra part II.B (discussing the Herring opinion). 
 113. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
 114. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 115. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (9th ed. 2009). 
 116. Id. at 1133. 
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Unfortunately, the Court leaves out a particularly significant element: the 
burden of proof.117 Yet, this is critical. If the defendant is expected to prove the 
recklessness of the police before evidence can be excluded, which the Court 
seems to assume,118 it will be a rule of nonexclusion. How is the defendant, 
typically represented by a publicly paid attorney, expected to prove not just that 
the police violated the Fourth Amendment, not just that they did not behave as 
reasonable policemen, but that they acted either in “conscious disregard of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk” that their conduct violated the Fourth 
Amendment, or were grossly negligent? It will be virtually impossible. Even if 
the burden is placed on the state to prove nonrecklessness; however, it is 
unlikely that the defendant would prevail. 
Imagine a typical cross-examination: 
Q. Officer, you searched the defendant’s house without obtaining a search 
warrant, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you aware of the warrant requirement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does it require? 
A. It requires that I get a search warrant before I can search someone’s house 
unless I got exi . . . umm, exi . . . Unless it’s an emergency. 
Q. And what were the exigent circumstances here? 
A. Well, we knew that the defendant sold heroin from his house and we were 
afraid that if we waited for a warrant it would all be gone. 
Q. But officer, you had no knowledge of how much he had or how fast it was 
likely to be gone, did you? 
A. No sir. But we know that it sells like hotcakes in this neighborhood. 
Q. Did you surveil the defendant’s house and see lots of people apparently going 
there to buy heroin? 
A. No sir. 
Is this a Fourth Amendment violation? Clearly it is, even assuming that the 
police had probable cause that the defendant was selling heroin from his house. 
They had no substantial basis for acting without a warrant.119 But did they act in 
“conscious disregard” of the warrant requirement? Even if the burden is on the 
 
 117. The Supreme Court has never clarified this issue with respect to motions to suppress, except in 
warrant cases, in which the defendant must establish that the police did not act in good-faith reliance on 
a legally issued warrant. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.2(b) (1978). 
 118. When the Court states that “to trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently 
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it,” Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702, it seems to assume that 
the defendant must establish this. Otherwise, the principle would be stated: “to avoid triggering 
exclusion, the violation must be shown to be less than reckless or systemic,” or with words to that 
effect. 
 119. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
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government, the answer is likely no. Only if the defense could show that this 
police department systematically disobeyed the warrant requirement or that the 
police officer “consciously disregarded” it could evidence be suppressed in this 
case. 
Because ignorance of the law makes its “conscious disregard” impossible, 
police departments would be encouraged to not train their officers, and Fourth 
Amendment compliance would dramatically decrease—the very problem that 
led to Mapp’s adoption of the mandatory rule. Further, the Court’s new 
standard for applying the exclusionary rule makes it even more difficult to 
apply than the current standard for warrant cases. As spelled out in United 
States v. Leon, the test is whether the officer acted in “reasonable good faith” in 
relying on a defective search warrant—a negligence standard.120 
VI 
A RECONCEPTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
This article’s purpose is to come up with a new approach, not to defend the 
current mandatory rule. And this “new approach” is to be found in the old 
words of the Fourth Amendment. It forbids only “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.” Negligence is “unreasonable.” 
Until now, the Court has set forth classes of cases, such as searches of 
houses and searches of cars. Then it has established the requirements for those 
searches to be considered “reasonable.” Warrants based on probable cause are 
required for houses, probable cause alone for cars, and only “reasonable 
suspicion” for frisks. If a given search does not meet the appropriate criterion, it 
is “unreasonable” by definition, without considering the culpability of the 
police. This has been, until Hudson, subject to only two exceptions: cases in 
which the principal violation was by a party other than the police and cases in 
which the forum where the evidence was to be used was not a criminal trial.121 
Now the Court is proposing to engage in a two-part inquiry in every case, 
considering first whether there was a breach and second whether the level of 
police culpability was reckless or systematic. This is similar to what is currently 
done in search-warrant cases under United States v. Leon. It will make trials 
more drawn out and complicated. And the answer will virtually always—absent 
uncharacteristic admissions of culpability by police—be nonexclusion. If we 
must engage in a second inquiry, the proper test can be found in the terms of 
the Fourth Amendment: If the police are negligent, they are, by definition 
“unreasonable,” and if the search is unreasonable, it violates the Fourth 
Amendment on its face. Therefore, the evidence should be excluded in cases of 
police negligence. 
 
 120. “[O]ur good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a 
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s 
authorization.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.23 (1984). 
 121. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 611–12 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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This may not seem so different from the current system, but it is, in fact, a 
dramatic change. Currently, trial courts do not consider whether a policeman’s 
conclusion that he had probable cause to search a car, or enter a house without 
a warrant, was “reasonable.” If the trial judge concludes that the officer did not 
have probable cause and that exigent circumstances were absent, the evidence is 
out, even though the judge might conclude that the policeman made a 
“reasonable” mistake in concluding that he had the requisite level of suspicion 
to justify his actions.122 
It is these cases that are most galling to conservatives. Consider, for 
example, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent from the denial of a stay in California v. 
Minjares,123 in which he laid out his objections to the exclusionary rule. In 
Minjares, the police stopped a car with probable cause that it had been involved 
in a robbery. After searching the passenger compartment of the car and finding 
nothing, the police opened the trunk and found and opened a tote bag 
containing evidence. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction and 
ordered the evidence suppressed on the ground that the warrantless search of 
the bag was impermissible, though the policeman would have had no way of 
knowing that this was how the case would be decided.124 Obviously the 
policeman’s behavior was “reasonable,” even if wrong. Therefore, under this 
approach, not only should the evidence not have been suppressed, but there was 
no Fourth Amendment violation at all. The police made a mistake, but it was a 
reasonable mistake. 
Even more galling to conservatives is a case like Arizona v. Gant, in which 
the police simply followed the then-governing precedent of New York v. Belton 
in searching, with no reasonable expectation of finding evidence, the passenger 
compartment of defendant’s car after he was arrested for driving on a 
suspended license. If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police 
misconduct by punishing them for violating Fourth Amendment, then it makes 
absolutely no sense to exclude evidence when police were following current, 
clearly established law.125 Gant should have declared a new rule that would have 
permitted admitting the challenged evidence in that case. 
The Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in Herring. Clearly, the 
arresting officers were not negligent and therefore did not violate the 
defendant’s rights. Herring hinges on a separate question: How far to cast the 
net of exclusion when someone in the employ of the police has acted 
 
 122. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (holding that evidence obtained when police had 
erroneously claimed exigent circumstances to enter a house must be suppressed). 
 123. 443 U.S. 916, 916–17 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.). 
 124. Id. at 919. Compare Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (agreeing with the California 
Supreme Court in a similar case), with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (overruling Robbins 
as well as, in effect, the California Supreme Court’s conclusion in Minjares). 
 125. Of course, the most galling case of all was Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966), in which in 
the course of investigating a rape, the police obtained an apparently voluntary confession from the 
suspect after two hours of interrogation. The confession was excluded on the ground that the defendant 
had not been informed of his right to counsel when this warning requirement did not yet exist. 
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negligently. It is preferable to draw a clear line between mistakes by the police 
in general and mistakes by other agencies,126 for, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out 
in dissent, the police’s negligent mistakes can and should be deterred by 
exclusion.127 Yet Herring encourages the police to make clerical “mistakes” 
when they want to arrest someone, though technically of course, such 
purposeful manipulation is forbidden. 
This article is a “reconception” because it completely changes the 
relationship between the Fourth Amendment, the rules of criminal procedure, 
and the exclusionary rule. Currently, all of the “rules” are cast in terms of the 
Constitution, because the Supreme Court, at least in the 1960s, evidently 
assumed that it had no power to make rules except to claim that each rule was 
based directly on the Constitution. Thus Miranda and its list of things that 
police must say to suspects before any interrogation, which came as close to 
pure rulemaking as the Supreme Court ever has, was based directly on the Fifth 
Amendment. 
What I propose here is that the Supreme Court forthrightly recognize—as it 
essentially did in Dickerson v. United States128 concerning Miranda—that it can 
make prophylactic rules that advance constitutional rights without declaring 
that every violation of the rules necessarily violates the Constitution. Thus, as 
Dickerson conceded, “the Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth 
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”129 
Dickerson was followed by United States v. Patane,130 in which the Court held 
that a presumptively improper failure to give the Miranda warnings when the 
defendant asserted that “I know my rights” would not require the exclusion of a 
gun found as a fruit of the defendant’s statement because the Miranda violation 
did not violate the Constitution directly the way an involuntary confession 
would have. 
Fourth Amendment analysis would be similar under this proposal, but 
would focus, as the Supreme Court insists it should, on police culpability. Each 
case would require two inquiries: First, whether the police broke the Supreme 
Court’s prophylactic rules as to search and seizure. If they did, then second, 
whether the prosecutor can establish that this violation was nonnegligent—
similar to the harmless-error rule, although the breach need not be “harmless,” 
just not negligent.131 
 
 126. As Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) seemed to do in refusing to excluded evidence when a 
mistake had been made in the clerk of court’s office. 
 127. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 708 (2009). 
 128. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 129. Id. at 441 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (refusing to apply the Fourth 
Amendment’s fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine to Miranda violations)); accord United States v. 
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (stating Miranda is a “prophylactic rule”). 
 130. 542 U.S. at 635. 
 131. I do not see the need for a further two-stage discussion of fruit of the poisonous tree. If a given 
seizure was unreasonable, it would likewise be unreasonable to use the fruits. 
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This approach is not terribly different from that taken by Judge Friendly in 
his article The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,132 discussed by the 
majority in Herring.133 Friendly argues that there should be a “penumbral zone 
where mistake will not call for the drastic remedy of exclusion.”134 However, 
under my approach, the “penumbral zone” would be considerably smaller, 
calling for exclusion when the police mistake is negligent (lots of cases), rather 
than when it is “intentionally or flagrantly illegal” (very few cases).135 
A prosecutor could prevail under this approach in several classes of cases, 
even if a constitutional violation were found. The first would be, as in Gant, 
when the police were following Supreme Court precedent that the Court has 
now determined to change.136 This is the approach taken by Canada, and its 
basic “reasonableness” can hardly be disputed.137 There is simply no police 
misconduct to deter. 
The second would be when, as in Minjares, the law was unclear but the 
police were reasonable in choosing the course of action that they did. Another 
such case is Kyllo v. United States,138 in which police, in beaming an electronic 
heat sensor at a home without a warrant, were acting in uncharted territory, 
legally speaking. The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote concluded that this 
police action was improper. Clearly these police did not deserve to be 
“punished” for their initiative, yet current exclusionary law presents no 
alternative to exclusion when a violation is found. After Kyllo, of course, with 
the law now established, police failure to abide by that ruling would be 
“unreasonable.” Courts would have to decide in each case whether police use of 
various surveillance methods on houses was consistent with Kyllo, and, if not, 
whether the police error was reasonable or not. 
The third class of cases would be those in which the police miscalculated a 
factual matter, such as exigent circumstances to search without a warrant, or 
 
 132. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 
(1965). 
 133. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
 134. Friendly, supra note 132, at 953. 
 135. Id. at 952. 
 136. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (changing the rules for searches incident to arrest in 
homes). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which the police’s warrantless bugging of 
a phone booth was held proper under Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
 137. I see no serious “case or controversy” problem here. It is true that if the Court declares a new 
rule, the defendant will be unsuccessful in getting the evidence excluded in this case. But defendants 
will claim that the police conduct was negligent and argue that existing precedent can be distinguished, 
as did the defendant in Gant. The Court can declare new rules even if the defendant did not ask for 
them. The Court could then reject the defendant’s claim that the police were “negligent” in this case. 
Although this will be unsatisfying to defendants, there is still a “case or controversy” over the two 
issues of whether there was a rule violation in this particular case and whether the police were negligent 
such as to violate the Fourth Amendment. See Safford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 
2633 (2009), in which the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation due to a search at school but 
then denied relief because the principal was not unreasonable in ordering the search. The Court’s 
current approach under Herring presents the same problem. 
 138. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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probable cause to search an automobile. This would, in effect, embody a 
“reasonable good faith” exception in nonwarrant cases, a notion that was much 
maligned by academic commentators before United States v. Leon.139 This 
proposal is a compromise between the mandatory rule, the essentially “non-
exclusionary rule” set forth in Herring, and the rule that the negative effect on 
some defendants will be lessened by placing the burden of proof on the 
government. Spinelli v. United States, in which the Court concluded, by a five-
to-three vote, that the evidence in a warrant application was not sufficient to 
add up to probable cause,140 exemplifies such a case in which evidence likely 
would not be excluded under my proposal. Because the police were wrong but 
not “unreasonable” in Spinelli, the evidence would be admitted. 
This negligence proposal is based on “reasonable good faith” with the 
emphasis on the “reasonable” or nonnegligent aspect of police behavior.141 
“Good faith” is added because a police officer’s objectively reasonable belief 
that he has probable cause should not excuse his conduct if he does not also 
subjectively believe that probable cause is present.142 This will not change many 
results in actual cases, because, despite current law, courts usually deny motions 
to suppress in serious cases,143 except, presumably, when the police misbehavior 
is blatant. 
These are new categories of nonexclusion under my proposal. They do not 
include the two previous categories set forth in Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Hudson: mistakes by someone other than police— (for instance, a magistrate, 
the legislature, or a court clerk)144 on which the police relied in good faith, and 
use of evidence in fora other than a criminal trial (such as a deportation hearing 
or probation revocation hearing). 
These categories of nonexclusion do not include behavior such as that in 
Hudson, in which the police at least recklessly, if not purposely, broke the 
 
 139. See articles cited in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 n.14 (1984). To some extent these 
criticisms were satisfied by the Court’s inclusion of a requirement that the violation be both 
“reasonable” and in good faith, a requirement that I reiterate here. 
 140. 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). 
 141. As Jerold Israel pointed out in an article quoted in Leon, 
The key to the [exclusionary] rule’s effectiveness . . . lies, I believe, in the impetus it has 
provided police training programs. . . . [An objective good faith exception] is not likely to 
result in the elimination of such programs, which are now viewed as an important aspect of 
police professionalism. Neither is it likely to alter the tenor of those programs; the possibility 
that illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely to encourage 
police instructors to pay less attention to fourth amendment limitations. 
Jarod H. Israel, Criminal Procedure in the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. 
L. REV. 1319, 1412 (1977) (quoted in Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20). By contrast, the recklessness standard 
proposed in Herring would encourage ignorance of the rules and thus discourage police training. 
 142. See Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal Procedure, 76 MISS. 
L.J. 339 (2006) (making this point in detail). 
 143. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the 
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 83 (1992). 
 144. And now, as Herring has held, a police clerical worker, at least from another police 
department. 
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“knock and announce” rule. It would have been a simple matter for the police 
to establish their belief that such a knock and announce would have been 
“dangerous or futile,” but they did not. If the Court had concluded in Hudson 
that the rule should never have been part of the Constitution in the first place, it 
should have overruled Wilson v. Arkansas,145 which first included “knock and 
announce” as a Fourth Amendment right. Instead, the Court insisted that an 
unannounced intrusion was still a constitutional violation but the evidence 
would not be excluded. Hudson is inconsistent with the Court’s later attempt in 
Herring to base exclusion on the culpability of the police. 
This proposal produces similar results to the Court’s current analysis of civil 
suits based on constitutional violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1983. First, under the 
formula established in Saucier v. Katz,146 a trial court should consider whether 
there was a constitutional violation but then give the officer immunity if “the 
officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable.”147 
This is illustrated by the recent “strip search” decision of Safford United 
School District #1 v. Redding.148 In Redding, the Court ruled that a strip search 
of a junior-high student for prescription drugs was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. But the Court then held that the principal who ordered the search 
was entitled to qualified immunity because “clearly established law [did] not 
show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.”149 The Court further 
noted that “even as to action less than an outrage ‘officials can still be on notice 
that their conduct violates established law . . . in novel factual circumstances.’”150 
This sounds very similar to my proposal for exclusion. 
Although the Court’s formulation reaches the same result as that I propose, 
it also puts the Court in the uncomfortable position of declaring that a search is 
simultaneously “unreasonable” (because it violates the Fourth Amendment) 
and “reasonable.” It would be much more straightforward for the Court to say 
to say that the strip search violated our Fourth Amendment based rules, so the 
police cannot do it again, but because of the uncertainty of the law at the time 
of the violation, the police acted reasonably. 
This proposal will work for the Fifth Amendment as well as for the Fourth, 
even though the Fifth does not include the helpful reasonableness standard. 
Ordinarily, the failure to give the Miranda warnings prior to a custodial 
interrogation is negligent, and subsequent statements by the suspect would have 
to be suppressed. In some situations, however, the applicability of Miranda may 
 
 145. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). 
 146. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 147. Id. at 205. Or, under Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) this analysis can be done in 
reverse order. Pearson overruled the mandatory order of the Saucier protocol, allowing courts to 
dispose of cases on qualified immunity grounds without discussing the alleged constitutional violation. 
Id. at 818–20. 
 148. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 149. Id. at 2643. 
 150. Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). 
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be in doubt. For example, in United States v. Patane, the policeman started to 
warn the defendant of his rights, and the defendant interrupted, declaring that 
he knew his rights. The policeman then did not finish reading the rights.151 
The Supreme Court assumed that the truncated reading violated Miranda in 
order to reach defendant’s fruit of the poisonous tree argument (which the trial 
court had sidestepped by ruling a gun Patane had later shown the police had 
been seized without probable cause). The Court assumed that Patane’s 
statement, had it been offered, would have to have been excluded so as not to 
comprise testimony against himself, but the gun he led them to was admissible. 
Under my approach, a court could well conclude that although the policeman 
should have given the full warnings to Patane, his failure to do so was not 
negligent. Accordingly, Patane’s statement would have been admissible, even 
though in future cases, with the rule now clearly established, failure to warn 
would be negligent. 
Likewise, in Oregon v. Elstad,152 the police failed to warn a youthful suspect 
who was being questioned in his living room by a single policeman with his 
mother nearby. The Court assumed that this was a custodial interrogation and 
therefore that his statements in the house (but not subsequent statements) must 
be excluded. A better resolution would have been to conclude, as the Court did, 
that even though the interrogation was custodial, the police mistakenly, but 
reasonably, treated it as noncustodial; therefore, his initial statement would be 
admissible. Miranda itself involved a brief interrogation of a rape suspect153 that, 
by pre-Miranda standards, could in no sense be deemed “unreasonable.” 
Once it is determined that police failure to warn is unreasonable; however, 
the Court’s tortured gyrations to get around the fruit of the poisonous tree rule 
should likewise be abandoned. The fruits of poisonous trees, when those trees 
are unreasonable police behavior, should never be admissible. Much of the 
reasoning in Elstad seems aimed at establishing that the violation in that case 
wasn’t really so bad and therefore shouldn’t have “poisonous fruit” 
consequences. This proposed rule is much more straightforward: negligent 
violations never lead to evidence, whether direct or as fruits, that is usable in 
the prosecution’s case in chief; nonnegligent violations always do. 
It may be argued that this approach will make it too easy for trial judges to 
admit evidence. It will certainly make it easier, especially when the police are 
acting in situations where the law is unclear. But it will perhaps make it easier 
for courts to establish new rules to guide police in the future when doing so 
does not require letting this defendant go free. In any case, it is already easy 
enough for courts to refuse exclusion. They can, for example, declare that 
certain police activity that can only be described as a “search” is not technically 
 
 151. 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
 152. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966). 
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a search under the Fourth Amendment.154 Or they can find exigent 
circumstances when a reasonable person would not see them. Or they can allow 
an auto search on what certainly does not seem like probable cause. The fact is, 
one way or another, courts already apply a “reasonableness” standard. Why not 
be forthright about it? 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, this article reconceives the exclusionary rule as applying to only 
those situations in which the police have violated the Fourth Amendment by 
acting “unreasonably.” But “unreasonableness” is determined case by case, 
rather than by categories of cases (searches of houses, searches of cars, et 
cetera) as the Court does it now. This proposal presents a two-pronged 
approach to exclusion. First, the defendant must establish that the Fourth 
Amendment rules were broken. Second, to avoid exclusion, the government has 
the opportunity to prove that the rule violation was not negligent. This is 
essentially the same as the approach applied to qualified-immunity issues in 
civil cases alleging constitutional violations. When the police are relying on 
Supreme Court precedent, when the law is simply undecided, or when the facts 
lead the courts to conclude that, though the police acted wrongly, their mistake 
was a reasonable one, the evidence should not be excluded. 
This proposal also applies to the Fifth Amendment. Ordinarily, failure to 
give the Miranda warnings to a suspect in custodial interrogation is an 
unreasonable or negligent violation, and any statement that the suspect makes, 
as well as its fruits, should be suppressed. But it is easy to imagine situations, 
such as those presented by Patane and Elstad, in which it is unclear whether the 
suspect was in custody or the warnings were otherwise required. In such cases, 
the police failure to warn could be considered wrong but reasonable, and the 
statement, and its fruits, should not be suppressed. 
 
 154. For cases in which searches are not such for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, see for 
example, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (searches of trash) and Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170 (1984) (searches of fenced and posted fields). See also Orfield, supra note 143. 
